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Abstract
One of the most important consequences of the Chilean pension reform under-
taken in the early 1980s was to transfer a significant portion of the risk associated
to the financing of pensions, from the State, to the pension fund participants of the
newly established compulsory pension system. This paper is concerned with the risk
embedded in the portfolio strategies of pension fund portfolio managers.
We develop an analytic framework that permits to incorporate the behavior of a
pension fund manager in the long-term risk assessment of its investment strategy,
where the latter is conducted from the point of view of the pension fund participant,
who has preferences over his/her final pension. The pension fund manager’s prob-
lem is cast as a dynamic portfolio choice problem, and its solution is used afterwards
to quantify the risk exposure of the pension fund participant.
Our results from a simulation exercise show that the lower is the risk aversion
of the participant, the higher is his/her Wealth-at-Risk —defined as the monetary
compensation that leaves the participant indifferent with respect to his/her outside
option— a result that is due to the fact that the outside option increases relatively
more than the benefit derived from the pension provided by the fund manager. The
same logic is behind the negative relationship between stock return volatility and
pension risk.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important consequences of the Chilean pension reform undertaken at
the beginning of the 1980s was to transfer a significant portion of the risk associated to
the financing of pensions, from the State —the only sponsor of the public pension sys-
tem at the time— to the members of the newly established compulsory pension system
based on individual accounts. A similar situation—although with a different intensity—
has occurred in other Latin-American countries that followed the same path (Argentina,
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, among others). From the perspective of
pension fund participants, this risk transfer has been further exacerbated by the fact that
under the new regime participants are also required to make investment decisions, by
choosing the investment vehicle that best fits their interests, among the different options
offered by the private portfolio managers in the market, known as Pension Fund Admin-
istrators (PFAs).
From a theoretical standpoint, the potential benefits of the new institutional arrange-
ment, over those of a pay-as-you-go pension system, rely on the assumption that the
incentives faced by PFAs allow them to better fulfill the implicit mandate of the pension
system’s participants (determined by their preferences). In principle, a fully funded pen-
sion system operated by private pension fund managers has the potential to provide a
better asset allocation. However, the materialization of such a benefit depends crucially
on the set of incentives that surrounds PFAs’ decisions. In most of the new private pen-
sion systems the key incentives influencing the behavior of PFAs come from the regula-
tory framework. In the case of Chile we can identify at least two such incentives. The first
one comes from the explicit mandate contained in the pension law that requires each PFA
to manage the pension funds having as its sole objective to obtain an adequate (nominal
or real) return, and the second from the so-called minimum return requirement, that estab-
lishes a penalty to the PFA if the average return (in the last 36 months) of the pension fund
under its management is below the industry average. From these two rules, in addition
to the natural interest of the fund manager to not underperform its competitors (which
is at the center of most PFAs’ commercial policy), one can understand the major forces
influencing the PFA behavior. In particular, one that emerges clearly is that the undesir-
able events, or relevant risks faced by a PFA, are of a relative kind (e.g., to underperform
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the industry due to differences in the selected asset allocation), while those that matter to
the pension fund participant are the events associated with the not receiving a reasonable
pension, in view with the contributions made when young.
In response to this situation many industry observers have raise the need to intro-
duce a risk measure aimed at limiting the adoption of investment strategies that may
be undesirable from the point of view of the pension system’s participants, in terms of
excessive risk taking. One of the alternatives that have been proposed is to adopt a risk
measure from a related industry, themost popular one being the Value-at-Risk (VaR)mea-
sure [Jorion (2001)], recently adopted by the Mexican pension regulator, which is simply
the quantile of the loss distribution associated to a given confidence level. Despite its
popularity, there are at least two reasons that make a risk measure based on short-term
fluctuations inappropriate for a long-term investor like a pension fund. The first one is
related to the unit of account that is usually employed (a nummeraire problem), while
the second is related to the need of characterizing the investment decisions of the fund
manager. In what follows we elaborate briefly on each one.
The Chilean pension system considers two alternatives in the asset deccumulation
phase: annuitization and programmed withdrawals, as well as the combination of both.
The first one consists in the purchase of an annuity from an insurance company, while the
second one implies the withdrawal of an amount equivalent to the annuity that could be
financed with the funds in the individual account (amount which is recomputed annu-
ally), so that the participant maintains the property of the funds in the individual account.
This last feature may serve the purpose of allowing the participant to choose a better tim-
ing for full annuitization, or perhaps, to fulfill a bequest motive; Horneff et al. (2006),
Milevsky and Young (2007). As a consequence, the annuity price at the time of retire-
ment is a key determinant of the consumption stream that the participant will be able to
finance during the retirement phase. It then follows that if the actions of the regulator are
aimed at limiting the short-term negative fluctuations of the pension funds, it well may
be the case that these actions end up restricting the adoption of investment strategies that
in terms of the final pension would be in principle beneficial from the perspective of the
participant. This would be the case, for instance, if the pension fund had a long position
in long term bonds whose prices can get negatively affected by an upward shift in the
(term structure of) interest rates, although from the point of view of the future pension
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such a fluctuation would be immaterial; see, e.g., Walker (2005) and Cairns et al. (2006).
The second consideration comes from the relatively short horizon considered by most
risk measures. In this sense, what is relevant for the pension regulator is to influence the
distribution of final pensions. The efforts to influence the short-term distribution of the
pension fund (even when the correct nummeraire is being used) are at best a suboptimal
situation. The key input between these two distributions is the investment policy selected
by the pension fundmanager, defined as a contingent asset allocation plan (i.e., a function
of time and the states of the world).
This paper proposes a methodology to assess the riskiness of the investment strategy
of a portfolio manager in a defined contribution pension system by focusing its atten-
tion on the distribution of final pensions, and that has the potential to incorporate the
two considerations discussed above, that is, to consider simultaneously an appropriate
nummeraire and the distribution of final pensions in the assessment of the risk that is
borne by a pension fund participant. To this end, and given the nature of the incentives
that are faced by the PFA, we consider an intertemporal portfolio choice problem which
is similar in spirit to the one postulated by Roll (1992), who considered a tracking-error
problem with respect to a benchmark portfolio. In order to consider dynamic invest-
ment strategies, we make use of the dynamic version of such a problem, recently studied
by Bajeux-Besnainou et al. (2005), to later on employ the optimal (dynamic) investment
strategy of the portfolio manager as an input in the assessment of the riskiness of the in-
vestment strategy selected by the PFA, which is done in terms of the distribution of final
pensions and the preferences of the representative pension fund participant.
By considering a simplified economic environment, we are able to numerically esti-
mate the Wealth-at-Risk (WaR) of a representative participant, defined as the monetary
compensation that leaves the participant indifferent in relation to his/her outside option,
whatever this may be. We found that participants which are less risk averse are those
exposed to the higher risks, a result that comes from the fact that the outside option un-
der consideration (the utility maximizing benchmark) is higher the less risk averse the
participant is.
We also found evidence suggesting that the common belief that a world with more
volatile stocks is riskier, when thinking in terms of Wealth-at-Risk, may be misleading.
In fact, we found that the WaR (or necessary compensation) increases when stock return
3
volatility decreases, a result that follows from the fact that, when volatility decreases,
the outside option under consideration increases relatively more that the benefit that the
individual derives from the pension provided by the pension fund manager.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on risk
measures in dynamic settings to then introduce a dynamic risk measure based on the
preferences of the representative participant, which will be at the center of our attention.
Section 3 describes the economic environment and characterizes the optimization prob-
lems faced by the representative participant and the pension fund manager. Section 4
develops a numerical exercise to illustrate the main findings, and section 5 briefly con-
cludes.
2 Monetary risk measures
The term risk was introduced into the economic literature in the paper by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970), through the concept of second order stochastic dominance (SSD), a con-
cept intended to establish a preference order among uncertain outcomes.1 Even though
the criterion was fairly intuitive, its generality turned out to be its main weakness when
confronted to the task of being used as a decision tool. In particular, the preference or-
der induced by SSD is a partial ordering, so it is not possible to establish an order of
preferences between any pair of uncertain outcomes. Almost 30 years later, the need to
have a well structured theory found its answer in the work of Artzner et al. (1999), which
gave birth to an axiomatic development of coherent risk measures. Formally, these authors
defined a risk measure as a mapping of the form ρ() : X 7! $  [ ∞,+∞], where
X stands for the set of random variables representing the possible outcomes of future
networth, that satisfy the following set of axioms:
 (monotonicity) X  Y ) ρ(X)  ρ(Y), 8X,Y 2 X .
 (subadditivity) ρ(X+Y)  ρ(X) + ρ(Y), 8X,Y 2 X .
 (translation invariance) ρ(X+ a) = ρ(X)  a, 8X 2 X , 8a 2 R.
1The SSD concept states that among two uncertain consumption bundles, with the same expected value,
say X,Y : Ω 7! R  R+, where Ω is the set of states of nature, X is strictly preferred to (or less risky than)
Y, if and only if, EP[u(X)] > EP[u(Y)], where u() : R+ 7! R is an increasing and concave utility function,
and EP [] is the mathematical expectation computed under some probability measure P.
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 (positive homogeneity) ρ(λX) = λρ(X), 8λ  0, 8X 2 X .
The interpretation of these axioms is straightforward and intuitive. The first one says
that the holding of a financial position (X) which renders a future net worth greater than
another (Y), in every state of the world, should be less risky. The second one incorporates
the well-known notion of diversification. The third one establishes that the riskless com-
ponent of a financial position decreases its risk on a one-by-one basis, while the fourth
axiom emphasizes the linear growth of the risk measurement.
Among these four axioms initially postulated, the fourth one has been criticized on
the grounds of the illiquidity problems that the holding of a sizeable financial position
could entail. Additionally, from the point of view of the regulator, the systemic risk in an
industry could increase more than linearly as the number of players in the industry gets
reduced, so that the linear growth in a risk measure might not be a desirable attribute.
The potential problems motivated by these considerations gave rise to more conservative
axioms, resulting in what is now known as convex risk measures [Frittelli and Rosazza
Gianin (2002), Föllmer and Schied (2002)] which are those that satisfy the properties of
monotonicity, translation invariance, and the following one in replace of the subadditivity
axiom,
 (convexity) ρ(λX+ (1  λ)Y)  λρ(X) + (1  λ)ρ(Y), 8X,Y 2 X , λ 2 [0, 1].
One of the most distinctive elements of the theoretical construct proposed by Artzner
et al., was the use of a set of acceptable future networths,2 from where the risk measurement
of a financial position is defined as the smallest distance to the set of acceptable future
networths. In this sense, Scandolo (2004) postulates the study of this problem by means
of a capital requirement, a concept defined by:
ρA , inffZ 2 R : Z+ X 2 A  Xg,
where A represents the set of acceptable future networths. The capital requirement ρA is
therefore given by the smallest amount required to be added (in the present) to make the
holding of the financial position X, whose value will be realized in the future, acceptable
in the present time.
2In their original work, the set of acceptable future networths is to be defined by the regulator, or the
counterparty in a financial transaction that bears the consequences of a financial decision made a third
party.
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Among others, Scandolo also shows that the acceptable set described by the set
AVaR , fX 2 X : P(X < 0)  α 2 [0, 1]g,
associated to the Value-at-Risk measure, fails to be convex in general, which implies the
non-convexity of its associated capital requirement,
ρVaRA , inffZ 2 R : P(Z+ X < 0)  αg.
Other acceptable sets that do satisfy the properties of monotonicity and convexity are
those associated to risk measures based on the worse conditional measure,
AWCM , fX 2 X : EP(X j A)  0, 8A 2 F with P(A)  0g,
those related to stress tests,
ASTRESS , fX 2 X : EPmX  0 8m, EQnX  F(Qn) 8ng,
where Pm and Qn are probability measures that amplify the frequency of specially ad-
verse events; and those based on increasing and concave expected utility functions,
Au , fX 2 X : EPu(X)  EPu(Xˆ)g, (1)
with Xˆ given.
In this article we will deal with a risk measure associated with acceptable sets of the
type in (1), where U = EPu(X) will stand for an expected utility index representing the
preferences of the representative pension fund participant.
Due to the dynamic nature of the portfolio manager’s problem to be introduced in the
next section, we need to deal with the intertemporal assessment of the riskiness implicit in
the investment strategy of the portfolio manager. On this subject, Detlefsen and Scandolo
(2005) have shown that under suitable conditions it is possible to define a dynamic risk
measure as a family (ρt)t2[0,T] of conditional riskmeasures adapted to a given information
filtration, where [0, T] denotes the length of the participant’s planning horizon. In such
a setting, these authors have postulated additional properties of time-consistency for a
dynamic risk measure. These properties are as follows (where 0 < t1 <    < tn < T is a
partition of the planning horizon):
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 (intertemporal consistency) ρti+1(XT) = ρti+1(YT) ) ρti(XT) = ρti(YT), 8XT,YT 2 X ,
1  i  n  1.
 (recursivity) ρti(XT) = ρti( ρti+1(XT)), 8X 2 X , 1  i  n  1.
 (supermartingale) ρti(XT)  Eti [ρti+1(XT)], 8X 2 X , 1  i  n  1.
The first property is based on the following intuition: if two financial positions will have
the same riskiness tomorrow (in each state of the world), the same conclusion should
be obtained today. The second property follows from the intertemporal consistency of
the translation invariance property, while the last one emphasizes the fact that as the
information is revealed, the riskiness of the of the financial position should decrease.
In this article we will consider a dynamic entropic risk measure which is the name that
receives a capital requirement when u is an exponential utility function.
3 The behavioral model
This section develops a model that is aimed at capturing the main motivations behind the
PFAs’ decisions, to then study the consequences that such behavior has on the resulting
distribution of pensions and the participant’s well-being. The model starts by recogniz-
ing the strong herding behavior that surrounds the portfolio decisions of most PFAs in
private pension systems with individual accounts (Srinivas et al. [2000]). This element is
considered by introducing an exogenous benchmark portfolio which enters as a relevant
consideration in the portfolio choice problem of the PFA. The solution to this problem is
then used to determine the terminal value of the individual account of the participant.
In order to conduct the analysis, we consider a representative participant.3 In partic-
ular, we assume that the welfare of the representative participant is related to the pension
he/she is able to finance with the terminal balance of his/her retirement account at the
time of retirement, time that we suppose to be exogenous for all purposes. The last step
of our analysis is to quantify the risk (measured as a capital requirement) to which the
participant is exposed to. To this end we employ a dynamic convex risk measure based
on the participant’s preferences.
3A welfare analysis about the consequences that a limited number of investment vehicles has in the
presence of heterogeneous investors is conducted by De Palma and Prigent (2004).
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The next sub-sections describe the economic environment under consideration, and
formally present the decision problems of the PFA and the representative participant.
3.1 Economic environment
(UNCERTAINTY) Time is continuous on an infinite horizon. The uncertainty is generated
by a d-dimensional Brownian motion process, W 2 Rd, defined on a complete, filtered
probability space, (Ω,F ,F = fFtgt0,P), where P is the natural probability measure de-
fined on (Ω,F ). Given that our interest is placed on the characterization of the situation
of interest, in what follows we will only point out the most relevant technical conditions,
and will assume that all processes to be introduced are well-defined. In particular, all
processes to appear have a strong solution, and all expressions involving (in)equalities of
random variables are to be understood to hold in the almost sure sense; that is, for any
two given random variables, x(ω), y(ω) : Ω 7! R, the expression x(ω)  y(ω) is to be
understood in the sense that P(x(ω)  y(ω)) = 1.
(CONSUMPTION SPACE) We consider an economy with a single perishable consumption
good that will be taken as the nummeraire. The consumption space is given by consump-
tion bundles X 2 X , L2+(Ω,F ,P), where L2+ is the space of square integrable random
variables.4
(PREFERENCES) The economy under consideration is populated by two agents, a repre-
sentative participant of a pension fund, and a PFA. The preferences of the participant are
represented by a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern index, defined over the value of
the individual account at retirement, XT 2 X , T > 0, of the form: Ut(XT) , Et [u(XT)],
where Et [] , E [ j Ft], 8t 2 [0, T], is the mathematical expectation, conditional on the
information set at time t (Ft), and the mapping u() : R+ 7! R is of class C2(R), with
u0() > 0, u00() < 0, which in addition satisfies Inada endpoint condition at infinity with
u0(+0) , limX#0 u0(X)  ∞. In the case of the PFA’s preferences, they are characterized
by a tracking error problem to be introduced below (Section 3.3).
(FINANCIAL MARKET) We consider a frictionless financial market where all sources of
uncertainty (generated by W) can be hedged away; that is, we consider a (dynamically)
4A random variable x is called p-integrable if P(xp < ∞) = 1. When p = 1, x is called integrable. When
p = 2, x is called squared integrable.
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complete financial market with no transaction costs, where the agents can rebalance there
portfolios continuously; Merton (1969, 1971). In particular the financial market is com-
prised of d + 1 assets, represented by a (locally) riskless money-market account (B 
(Bt)t0), and d (locally) risky securities (S  f(Sit)t0g1id). The dynamics of these as-
sets is dictated by the following system:
dBt = rtBtdt, B0 = 1,
dSt + δtdt = IS (µtdt+ σtdWt) , S0 2 Rd++ given,
(2)
where IS is a diagonal matrix of dimension d, that contains the price of each risky asset
on its diagonal, and the quantities
(r, µ, δ, σ)  f(rt, µt, δt, σt) 2 R+ Rd+ Rd+ Rdd/f0ggt0
are functions of the trajectories of W (or Itô processes) that satisfy the conditions for B
and S to be integrable processes.5 They represent, respectively, the instantaneous interest
rate, the expected return of the risky securities, their corresponding expected dividend,
and the volatility matrix.
(PENSION FUND) The evolution of the pension fund, described by Fpi  fFpit  0g0<tT,
is determined by the dynamic investment strategy adopted by the PFA, pi  fpit 2
Rdg0tT, where pit stands for the dollar amount invested in each of the risky assets.
For a given investment strategy, the dynamics of the pension fund is governed by the
following system:(
dFpit = [F
pi
t   pi0t1]rtdt+ pi0t[I 1S (dSt + δtdt)] + det;
F0 > 0; Fpit +Et
hR T
t ξt,sdes
i
 0, 8t 2 [0, T]; FT = FpiT ,
(3)
where det  0 is the contribution made by the participant,
ξt,s , exp

 
Z s
t

ru +
1
2
θ0uθu

du 
Z s
t
θ0udWu

,
where θ , σ 1(µ   r1) is known as the market price of risk (MPR), is the stochastic
discount factor (SDF) that is consistent with the absence of arbitrage opportunities.6 The
5A stochastic process x is called p-integrable if P(
R T
0 x
p
t dt < ∞) = 1. When p = 1, x is called integrable.
When p = 2, x is called squared integrable.
6The SDF is the time-t price of acquiring one unit of the nummeraire good which is to be delivered (with
certainty) at a later time s.
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symbol (0) denotes transposition, 1 = (1, . . . , 1)0 2 Rd, Fpit   pi0t1 represents the amount
invested in the money-market account (that provides a return of rt between t and t+ dt),
while the remainder, pi0t1, denotes the amount invested in the risky assets (that provides
a return given by capital gains plus dividends (dSit + δ
i
tdt)/Sit, between t and t+ dt, for
i = 1, . . . , d).
(INVESTMENT PLANS) In what follows, we will denote the set of investment plans that
satisfy the system in (3), along with the conditions VAR(FT) < ∞ and Fpit being a squared
integrable process, by Api(F0). A dynamic investment plan pi 2 Api(F0) will be called
admissible.
3.2 The problem of the representative participant
We now analyze the problem of the representative participant, whose well-being at time
t is represented by the index Ut(XT). In order to explicitly consider the nummeraire
problem that we mentioned in section 1, we will assume thatUt takes the following form:
Ut(XˆT) , Et

1  exp

 γ XˆT
aT

, 8t 2 [0, T], (4)
where γ > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient,
γ =  u00(Xˆ)/u0(Xˆ),
and aT denotes the price of a one dollar paying immediate constant annuity that start
paying at time T.7
The expression in (4) assumes that the participant annuitizes the full value of the
retirement account at retirement. Even though most mandatory private pension sys-
tems based on individual account consider an additional disbursement alternative, called
programmed withdrawals, the amount of the disbursements of this latter alternative is
closely related to the value of aT. In this sense, the assumption is not particularly restric-
tive.
7A constant life annuity is a contract between a buyer (annuitant) and a seller (insurer) that pays out a
constant periodic amount for as long as the buyer is alive, in exchange for an initial premium; Brown et
al. (2001). The insurer collects the premiums and invests them in order to meet liabilities arising from the
payouts.
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Remark 1 The adoption of the functional form in (4) is directly related to the convenience form
of the capital requirement that results when the set of acceptable future networths8
Aut , fXpiT 2 X : Ut(XpiT )  Ut(XˆT)g, (5)
where XpiT is the terminal value of the retirement account generated by the investment strategy pi,
chosen by the PFA, while XˆT corresponds to a subjective reference value set by the participant, that
might account for his/her outside option given by, for instance, investing on his/her own.
In the case of a participant with a high expertise in financial affairs, it would be natural
to set XˆT as the quantity that is the solution to the problem,9
max
pi2Api(F0)
U0(XˆpiT ). (6)
The following remark identifies the optimal value of XˆpiT that a participant with a high
degree of expertise would pursue before retirement.
Remark 2 (the expert’s solution) At any time t 2 [0, T], the utility of a participant with
a high expertise in financial affairs will be given by Ut(XˆT), where Xˆ

T  J(ytξt,TaT)+ ,
(aT/γ) ln(ytξt,TaT/γ)
 , x , max(x, 0), yt > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to
the ‘static version’ of the budget constraint, that is the solution to10
Et

ξt,T J(ytξt,TaT)
+

= Xt +Et
Z T
t
ξt,sdes

.
Proof. The static version of the problem faced by the representative participant at time t 2
[0, T] is given by [see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1998, Chapter 4)]:
max
XT2X
Et

1  exp

 γXT
aT

, subject to: Et

ξt,TXT
  Xt +Et Z T
t
ξt,sdes

.
By the concavity of the problem and the non-negativity constraint for XT, from the first-order-
conditions we obtain XT = (aT/γ) ln (ytξTaT/γ)
 . The Lagrange multiplier, yt, is obtained by
substituting XT into the static budget constraint, which must hold with equality since u() is an
strictly increasing function.
8One of attributes of the capital requirement that results from this acceptable set is given by the fact that
the preferences defined by the order X % Y , U(X)  U(Y), are preserved. That is to say, the preferred
consumption bundle is also the less risky; see Detlefsen and Scandolo (2005, Remark 11).
9Note that given the form of the objective function the solution to (6) is dynamically consistent.
10Note that the equation admits a unique solution, and that the following condition must be satisfied
yt > 0.
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3.3 The PFA problem
In line with the current practice in the Chilean PFA industry, we assume that PFA’s invest-
ment decisions can be characterized by a tracking error problem as in Roll (1992). That is,
we assume that the PFA’s goal is to minimize the relative volatility between the pension
fund and an exogenous benchmark portfolio, Y, subject to a minimum expected return
performance. Under this assumption, the PFA problem is analogous to the following
control problem, for 0  t < s  T,
min
Fpis 0
VAR [Fpis  Ysj Ft] , subject to: Et[Fpis ] = Fter¯(s t), Ft > 0, (P1)
where r¯ > 0 is theminimum return performance set by the PFA, andYs  0 is the terminal
position of the benchmark portfolio, whose dynamics is dictated by
dYu = YuµYudu+Yu(σ
Y
u )
0dWu + deu, Yt = Ft,
where µYu = [(1  φ0u1)ru+ φ0uµu] and σYu = φ0uσu denote, respectively, the expected return
of the benchmark portfolio (resulting from the amounts invested in the money-market
account and the whole set of risky assets) and its volatility, while φu 2 [0, 1]d stands for
the fraction invested by the benchmark portfolio in each one of the (locally) risky assets.
It is important to note that the investment horizon of the PFA (s  t) may differ from the
planning horizon of the representative participant (T   t). This is so due to the fact that
the compensation scheme of the pension fund manager may be tilted towards a shorter
horizon.11
Problem (P1) has been recently studied by Bajeux Besnainou et al. (2005), who have
extended the results of Bajeux Besnainou and Portait (1998) to the case of dynamic mean-
variance problems in presence of benchmark portfolios. One of the most interesting
results of the research program undertaken by these authors is the characterization of
the solution of dynamic portfolio choice problems, by means of static (i.e., buy-and-hold)
investment strategies whose underlying components are portfolios that are rebalanced
dynamically. The identification of these portfolios allows the complete characterization
of the optimal investment plan of the fund manager. The next proposition characterize
the solution of problem (P1).
11Mangiero et al. (2006) found that compensation schemes of Chilean pension fund managers are de-
signed towards relatively short horizons (less than 2 years).
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Proposition 1 (Bajeux Besnainou et al. (2005)) The solution of problem (P1)) is given by
Fs = Ys + κt,s   [κt,sBs(t)]Lt,s (7)
where κt,s  (1  fBs(t)2/Et[ξ2t,s]g)/(2(Fter¯(s t)  Et [Ys])), Bs(t) is the time-t price of a zero
coupon bond of maturity s, and Lt,s  ξt,s/Et[ξ2t,s] denotes the payoff associated to theminimum
norm portfolio.12 The investment strategy associated with Fs is of the buy-and-hold type. It
is comprised of: (1) a long position in the portfolio that replicates the benchmark portfolio by
an amount of Ft, (2) a long (resp. short) position in the zero coupon bond by an amount of
κt,sBs(t) if κt,sBs(t) > (<)0, and (3) a short (long) position in the minimum norm portfolio if
κt,sBs(t) > (<)0 by an mount of κt,sBs(t).
Proof. See Bajeux Besnainou et al. (2005, Proposition 1).
Remark 3 The investment strategy of the pension fund manager will be (dynamically) mean-
variance efficient as long as the benchmark portfolio (Y) is efficient as well; Roll (1992). Bajeux-
Besnainou and Portait characterize the set of (dynamically) mean-variance efficient portfolios as
those that can be written in the form Fs = a  bLs, with a, b 2 R++.
From the expression in (7) we can see the need to impose further structure on the
functional forms of the quantities (r, θ), in order for the investment strategy in Proposition
1 to be actually identified. This is so due to the fact that the quantities κt,s, Bs(t) and Lt,s
implicitly depend upon the expressions Et[ξt,s], Et[Ys] and Et[ξ
2
t,s], 0  t < s  T. With
this in view, the numerical exercise developed in the next section imposes simplifying
assumptions on the dynamics of these quantities.
4 Numerical exercise
This section illustrates by means of a numerical exercise the relationship between the
investment strategy of the benchmark portfolio, and the fraction of the present value of
the participant’s wealth,
At , Xt +Et
Z T
t
ξt,sdes

,
12Bajeux Besnainou and Portait (1998, §2.2) show that the return of the minimum norm portfolio is the
one that minimizes the second moment among all admissible portfolios.
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that is accounted for the capital requirement
ρut (X

T ) = inffZt 2 L2(Ft) : Ut(XT + Zt)  Ut(XˆT)g.
This last quantity is to be denominated in the risk-free security, which in our case cor-
responds to a one dollar paying annuity, deferred by T   t years. We will called this
quantity the Wealth-at-Risk (WaR) of a participant associated with the outside option Xˆ.
For the case of exponential preferences, the capital requirement (ρut (X

T )) is given by
the expression
ρut (X

T ) =
1
γ
ln

Et

exp

 γX

T
aT

  1
γ
ln
 
Et
"
exp
(
 γ Xˆ

T
aT
)#!
. (8)
In addition, the rational price of a one-dollar paying annuity, deferred by T   t years,
corresponds to
T taT = Et
Z ∞
T
ξt,s (spt) ds

, (9)
where (spt) stands for the probability that a participant of age t survives for s  t addi-
tional years.13 The WaR at time t is therefore given by ρut (X

T )/(At/T taT).
4.1 A parametric model
We study the simplest model possible in order to carry out the analysis. In particular,
we consider a model with a single source of uncertainty (d = 1) and two financial assets.
The dynamics of these assets is given by the system
dBt/Bt = rtdt, B0 = 1,
dSt/St = (µ+ rt)dt+ σdWt, S0 2 R++ given,
(µ, σ) 2 R2++, where for the instantaneous interest rate we adopt a Vasicek (1977) specifi-
cation,14
drt = λr (κr   rt) dt  σrdWt, r0 given.
13We referred the interested reader to Milevsky (2006) for a comprehensive introduction of actuarial sci-
ence and its concepts.
14We notice that the interest rate dynamics is written with a negative sign on the volatility parameter,
which is assumed positive. As will become clear later, this assures that all volatilities in the model are pos-
itive and induces the negative correlation between interest rates and stock and bond prices that is typically
observed.
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Our interest in modelling the dynamics of the interest rate (IR) is based on our worry
to not overstate the riskiness of equity. In particular, we want to consider the nega-
tive correlation between IR and stocks prices and deferred annuities (or long term bond)
prices.
Another factor that we take into account is the difference between the investment hori-
zon of the PFA and the planning horizon of the pension fund participant. In particular,
the exercise considers an investment horizon of one month in the PFA problem, while the
planning horizon of the participant is one of the variables to be examined.
Additionally, we assume that biometric and financial sources of uncertainty are in-
dependent. In particular, in the computation of the deferred annuity price [equation
(9)] we employed a mortality distribution governed by a law of the Gompertz-Makeham
type [Carriere (1994)], with a force of mortality given by λt = λ+ (1/b) expf(t m)/bg,
where λ > 0 is a constant that captures accidental mortality factors, while (m, b) are pa-
rameters of the distributions that need to be estimated. Under these assumptions, the
probability of survival of an individual of age t, for s   t additional years, is given by
[see, e.g., Charupat and Milevsky (2002)]
spt = exp

 λ(s  t)  1
b
Z s
t
e((s t) m)/bds

= exp
n
 λ(s  t) + b(λt   λ)(1  e(s t)/b)
o
.
Consequently, the rational price of a deferred annuity under the Vasicek specification is
given by
T taT =
Z ∞
T
h
exp
n
m(t, s)  n(t, s)rt   λ(s  t)) + b (λt   λ)

1  e(s t)/b
oi
ds
where [see, for instance, Glasserman (2004)]
m(t, s) =   (κr + σrθ/λr)

(s  t) + 1
λr
h
e λr(s t)   1
i
+
σ2r
2λ2r

(s  t) + 1
2λr

1  e 2λr(s t)

+
2
λr

e λr(s t)   1

,
n(t, s) =
1
λr

1  e λr(s t)

.
In spite of the simplicity of the model under consideration, the expression in (8) can-
not be computed analytically. Fortunately, its structure is amenable for Monte Carlo
simulation, which is the avenue we pursue in what follows.
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4.2 Calibration
We calibrate all parameters in annual frequency. The interest rate data was obtained from
the return of the fixed-income index LVACLI (www.LVAindices.com) for the period 2001–
2006 (1336 observations). The estimated coefficients were λr = 3.6636, κr = 0.0394, σr =
3.08 10 6. For the excess return and the volatility of the stock we used the daily returns
of the Santiago Stock Exchange Index (IPSA) for the same period (µ = 0.0889, σ = 0.2057).
In the case of the parameter γ, we calibrate it in a way that the representative participant
were willing to accept the same bets that an individual with CRRA preferences would
accept at t = 0, had the latter a relative risk aversion coefficient in the set f1, 2, 3, 4g.15
The parameters (λ,m, b) were obtained by fitting the survival probabilities of the
Gompertz-Makeham function to the official mortality tables at different ages (Superin-
tendency of PFA [2004]) using a non-linear least-square method.
The minimum return performance was set at r¯ = 0.05, and the present value of con-
tributions,
E0
Z T
0
ξ0,tdet

= E0
Z T
0
ξ0,t∆dt

,
at 5, where ∆ > 0 is the fix contribution made by the participant.
For the baseline case we fixed the investment horizon of the PFA in one month (i.e.,
s  t = 1/12). The final step in the calibration was to restrict the bets of the PFA [second
and third terms in (7)] to more realistic values. Using the observed composition of PFAs
portfolios we constrained the bets to the such that κt,s 2 Kt = [ 10%Yt, 10%Yt], 8t. All
the results to be presented next were computed for a single male that retires at age 65.
4.3 Simulation results
Figure 1 shows the results obtained by a simulation of 10,000 trajectories of a 1-dimensional
Wiener process, from which we computed the averages of the quantities involved in the
conditional expectations of the expression in (8).16 The numbers on the vertical axis in
the figure represent the fraction of wealth that a participant should receive at the time
15An individual with CRRA preferences and a relative risk aversion coefficient in the set f1, 2, 3, 4g,
would be willing to give up to 2.0%, 4.0%, 6.0% and 7.6% of his current wealth, respectively, in order to
avoid a fair bet involving a variation in his wealth of 20%.
16The asymptotic properties of this unbiased estimator are analized in detail by Detemple et al. (2006). In
our case, the only relevant error is the one produced by the approximation of the conditional expectation
by the average of the replications; Glasserman (2004).
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of the measurement, in order to reach a level of expected utility equivalent with that of
his/her outside option, which is given by the utility maximizing solution, Ut(XˆT). For
the benchmark portfolio that enters into the PFA’s portfolio problem we selected the de-
fault portfolio of the Chilean system, which allows equity investment to be up to 60%,
40% and 20% of the pension fund, depending on the age bracket of the participant from a
total of three, where the central age bracket is the widest: from 36 to 55 years of age. For
simplicity we assume that the investment strategy of the benchmark is to invest up to the
allowable maximum in equity, which is what has been happening since 2002, when the
number of investment strategies per pension fund was increased from one to five.
[Figure_01 about here]
The figure shows the WaR of the median trajectory (50th quantile) of the retirement ac-
count balance for different levels of risk aversion. In terms of risk aversion, the less risk
averse the participant is, the higher his/her risk exposure (measured as a capital require-
ment). This is due to the outside option of the participant,Ut(XˆT), since a less risk averse
participant demands a higher compensation in every state of the world (recall the expres-
sion XˆT  (aT/γ) ln(ytξt,TaT/γ) ). In particular, for a participant with a risk aversion
similar to that of an individual with a RRA coefficient of 1, the compensation goes from
540% of his/her total wealth when young, to near 130% when old, while for a partici-
pant with a risk aversion similar to that of an individual with a RRA coefficient of 4, the
required compensation goes down from 210% to near 55%, respectively. One conclu-
sion that can be drawn from this figure is that a suboptimal investment strategy imply
huge losses for a participant, with respect to the one generating the payoff XT. Taking
the previous case as our base case scenario, we carried out several exercises of interest,
focusing our attention in the associated capital requirement variation, which we called
‘Incremental WaR’.
[Figure_02 about here]
Our first exercise is presented in Figure 2. It presents the incremental WaR (i.e., the
WaR change with respect to our baseline case) associated with a benchmark portfolios
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consisting in static buy-and-hold strategies that differ the equity holding in the last age
bracket; a change that would have an impact on all participants at different ages. The
upper panel in the figure corresponds to the case where the equity holding in the last age
bracket is raised to 80% (from the initial value of 20%), while the lower panels correspond
to cases in which the equity holding has been changed in +40%, +20% and  20%, with
respect to the baseline case. From the figure it is possible to see that the WaR of the
individual decreases as the equity exposure is decreased, reaching its minimum when
the equity exposure is equal to zero, where a WaR reduction of near 20% is attained.
[Figure_03 about here]
Our second exercise is presented in Figure 3. It follows the same logic of the previous
one, but this time the changes are performed over the middle age bracket (36 to 55 years
old). The upper panel corresponds to the case where the equity holding has been raised
to 80% (from an initial value of 40%), while the lower panels correspond to cases in which
the equity holding has been changed in +20%,  20% and  40%, with respect to the
baseline case. From the figure, it is possible to see that an increase in the equity holding
would benefit individuals with lower risk aversion (two upper panels), but it would hurt
those who are more risk averse. From the third upper panel one can see that a decrease
of 20% in the equity holding would hurt everybody, while the opposite is true for the case
when the equity holding is decreased to zero (bottom panel), where a WaR reduction of
near 30% is obtained for younger participants.
[Figure_04 about here]
Figure 4 shows the case in which the equity holding is changed for the first age bracket.
The upper panel represents the case where the equity holding has been raised to 80%
(from an initial value of 60%), while for the lower panels the changes correspond to 20%,
 40%, and  60%, with respect to the baseline case. It can be seen that a change in
the equity holding for the first bracket is of a lower order of magnitude, with respect to
the previous cases. In addition, these changes only affect the distribution of pensions
of younger participants, since the portfolio policies affecting older participants remain
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unchanged. The upper panel shows that an increase in the equity holding would benefit
individuals with low risk aversion the most. The only case in the figure where a change
in equity holding results in a decrease of welfare is the case of a reduction of 40% (third
upper panel). Such a changewould hurt younger participants with a risk aversion similar
to those with a RRA coefficient of 1.
[Figure_05 about here]
In Figure 5 we explore the effects of a decrease in total wealth. We consider two cases:
one where the participant has a retirement account balance which is 80% of the base case
(at each time of measurement), and a second one where the participant has an income
stream which is 80% of the baseline case. The first case is presented in the upper panel of
Figure 5. the picture shows that the effect is an increase in theWaRwhich is decreasing in
the planning horizon. This means that relative to the baseline case, and after a negative
shock has hit the balance of the retirement account, the outside option, Ut(XˆT), is even
more preferred than the one delivered by the pension fund manager,Ut(XT ). Moreover,
the WaR variation is almost identical to all participants, irrespective of their risk aversion.
The second case (i.e., a negative shock in the income stream) is illustrated in the bot-
tom panel of Figure 5. The picture shows that the magnitude of this type of shock is
increasing in the planning horizon. The effects are of the same order of magnitude than
those in the previous case. From these pictures one can conclude that for individuals
with exponential preferences, the portfolio manager should follow a more conservative
investment policy after a negative shock has occurred. In addition, the effects are similar
to all individuals, irrespective of their risk aversion.
[Figure_07 about here]
Our last exercise is directed to assess the relation between the stock return volatility
and pension risk, when the latter is measured as a capital requirement. To this end we
recomputed the incremental WaR relative to our baseline case considering a less volatile
stock return (80% of initial volatility). Figure 6 shows our results. They strongly suggest
that the common association between risk and stock return volatility can bemisleading, at
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least when risk is understood as a capital requirement defined over an acceptable set with
an outside option equal to Ut(XˆT). The picture shows that in a world with less volatile
stock return individuals should be compensated with higher amounts. This is due to the
fact that the new outside option,Ut(XˆT), is relatively higher than the one delivered by the
fund manager, Ut(XT ). Behind this result there is a critical point related to the outside
option of our choice: the possibility of dynamic rebalancing. Unlike the static buy-and-
hold investment policy followed by the benchmark portfolio, our outside option reacts to
changes in the MPR according to the participant’s preferences.
5 Conclusions
This paper is a first step in the direction of consistently assessing the investment risk
embedded into the portfolio of a pension fund and the investment strategy of a pension
fund manager. In particular, it proposes a methodology that focus on the distribution
of pensions that is generated by an investment policy that is consistent with the strong
herding behavior surrounding fund manager’s decisions; the object that matters the most
in a mandatory pension system.
Our methodology adopts the point of view of the participant by explicitly modeling
his/her preferences, and taking into account the fact that pension fund managers might
pursue a different investment goal (e.g., tracking down its own relevant benchmark port-
folio). In a sense, the task of regulators is similar to the one of solving a principal-agent
program, where the main output of the solution is given by the identification of an ap-
propriate benchmark portfolio for the pension fund manager to pursue.
When pension risk is measured as a capital requirement, which is defined over an
outside option given by the utility maximizing policy, our results suggest that a policy
maker that cares equally about all participants of the system should worry more about
those who are less risk averse (in the classical sense), since they are the ones bearing
greater risks. The reason for this is that less risk averse participants are the ones having
the higher outside options, and thus the ones demanding higher compensations.
The results from the stylized model presented in section 4 also show that the higher
risk reductions are attained when the benchmark portfolio contains a good deal of fixed
income securities. In terms of negative shocks to the participant’s wealth, shocks to the
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balance of the retirement account or the flow of contributions have similar consequences
for all participants.
One clear implication of our results is that there is no direct relationship between stock
return volatility and pension risk. In particular, pension risk is shown to increase steeply
with a reduction in stock returns volatility, a result that is based on the fact that the outside
option of our choice increases relatively more than the utility that the participant derives
from the pension delivered by the pension fund manager.
One of the main drawbacks of the proposed methodology is given by the lack of a
clear cut to guide policy makers. Many of the policy implications that can be derived
from it depends crucially on the particular preferences of the participants, or the specific
weights that one may assign to each group on some social welfare function. In this sense,
it would be desirable for future work to concentrate on an acceptable set that provides
further guidance in these terms.
A second consideration is given by the way in which the proposed methodology can
be implemented. In particular, one of the key input needed is the investment policy of
the pension fund manager, a policy that would probably be modified when PFAs deci-
sions are framed in an environment subject to (pension) risk limits. These and other
considerations will be the focus of a future work.
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